Begining

Ideology and violence

Before moving on to the second theme of the article let’s take a somewhat more closer look at the issue of hegemony by continuing to analyze the examples presented and by attempting to formulate certain general conclusions.

We have seen on what elements of common sense can be built ideological messages spread on external conveyances of vision (in urban space) and by television (if we continue the description using Gramsci’s lexicon of hegemony).

For the example taken from Armenian TV programs,  the solidarity of local, narrowly confined, community interests and “good guys” is typical - a model male type of our day - with contiguous values, including slang language which is a complex amalgam of the language of different urban strata, thieves, rabiz types, etc. Of course, not everything here should be denied but it is rejectable when presented as a model of social relations, as a normative code of conduct. With that meaning in mind this rule, by cultivating a certain local interest, doesn’t only not provide a civil attitude and models for social solidarity, but simply excludes them.

We should also note that for the most part it’s the language of the newly created elite that has come to power (a totally marginalized language during Soviet times) which is brought into the public sphere becoming one more means for that strata to be legitimized. Being a way to clarify relations and to accurately define and maintain the hierarchical system, this language is immediately linked to the exercise of coercion. It is constantly to be found within the field of power relations and more than any other language carries the stamp of compulsion and violence. Indeed, “my weapon is my language”.

Thus, it’s apparent that this language is an important component of the cultural rule outlined in the post -Soviet era, it isn’t intended for criticism, analysis or designed to conceptualize social issues and objectives. It is the last stage of a totally civilian community where the individual and the community are depoliticized, whilst dissent and diversity of opinion are excluded according to limits where the preeminent skill is to survive at all costs. In short, it’s a language that condemns the new elite to babbling and civil impotence or to legitimation, while at the same time putting it out of reach of any given criticism and alternative.

As way of introduction the “My weapon is my…..” slogan appeared on street billboards celebrating the 15th anniversary celebrations of the Armenian Army in 2007. These billboards showed well known representatives of various fields (singers, writers, the Church) proclaiming “My weapon is my song, my word, my faith, etc...). In essence these ads also had an internal political message supporting Serzh Sargsyan, then the Defense Minister. “My weapon is my…” - the ideological kernel of common sense in the unqualified appreciation of the army in visual propaganda (given that the Armenian Army, victorious in the Karabakh War, was the largest accomplishment during the independence period and the guarantor of an independent state); the self-evident truth of the army’s irrefutable importance. At the same time it provides a model of an Armenian intellectual. He is the soldier of the fatherland. There is no longer any questionable thing remaining. In the relations of the authorities-intellectuals, the true intellectual serves the fatherland; in other words the authorities.

It is clear and entirely characteristic that here too we are concerned with violence, weapons, the army, even at the moments of explosive holiday cheer and patriotism, the personification of coercion and violence, especially since here the army manifests itself as an essential factor unifying the nation. It is correct, in reality it’s more underlined, the spontaneous readiness of the soldier and the realized submissiveness, submissiveness that is encouraged as a model expression of citizenship.

It is understandable that those included in this project, to varying degrees, represent the cultural elite of today that, one must assume, enjoys the sympathy or patronage of the authorities. The first thing that strikes the eye is the homogeneity, the variety. In the same row are Tigran Mansuryan and Tata, Aghasi Ayvazyan and Ashot Ghazaryan, Garegin II and Nune Yesayan. Perhaps this is a more democratic approach, where there is a no contraposition between low and highbrow culture but rather a market principle at work. All are present here - those who are well known, who enjoy mass popularity and fame.

One thing is clear. This is a glaring violation of the law of modernism known to us from the Soviet period and in the order that I have used while listing names of the heroes in the above project I wanted to note the existence of that hierarchy at least in the not too distant past. This also delicately and indirectly shakes the modern mould of the great national intellectual (and the national elite formed from these intellectuals). More correctly, it registers the fact of the disappearance of such intellectuals and the upper class during our day. Not one of these soldiers inherently personifies the national identity, the spirit or essence of the nation, as let’s say Hovhannes Tumanyan or Martiros Saryan, nor can a certain number of them fill-up or exhaust that reserve of identity. In principle, the row has no end; all, even the most remarkable, the writer, musician, Catholicos, is subordinated to the collective, to the principle of the army and rank and file. The cultural is henceforth subordinate to the political or military.

Thus, we can assume that we are dealing with a newly forming socio-cultural situation where elements of the post-Soviet order that remind one of the consumerism and despotism of western mass culture are being brought together in a paradoxical manner, thus creating, or at least suggesting, a new style of hegemony.

In his “Prison Notebooks” Gramsci speaks of the crisis of hegemony, which occurs when the old system finds itself in a total social, economic and ideological crisis and when those forces that could have transformed the existing order into a new one either don’t exist or are weak. In this state of affairs common sense is deprived of its base and the ruling classes loose their moral and cultural influence on society. Just as Gramsci, other theorists claim that the establishment of a dictatorship is one of the possible ways out of such a crisis.

The clear signs of a similar crisis existed during the final stage of Soviet power, the years of stagnation. Furthermore, there are grounds to claim that this crisis was total after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And I believe that the insoluble problem that’s been with us for almost two decades of having a national state, namely overcoming the crisis of cultural hegemony, has essentially remained unresolved and that the society of Armenia faces the same problem today as it did on the first day of independence. In other words, during the last years, the “cultural revolution”, namely westernization, as shown by the post-election incidents, haven’t reached any final stage, seemingly due to being severely lacking, not though-out or inconsistent; but rather a bit nationalistic and folkloric and Soviet-Russian and the remainder, dictatorial. Thus, the refrain, “my weapon is my...” is an announcement regarding an uncompleted event. Perhaps the reserves of cultural hegemony must be joined together and removed from the field of violence, in any case, from under the supervision of the army. But is it possible to do such a thing in a country where state coercion never remains within the legal confines or within the media outlets that are constantly under the scrutiny of the authorities? According to this, the Armenian electronic media outlets, rather than being a resource to reach social accord, are exclusively converted into conduits for the application of symbolic violence, especially during election periods since they possess and carelessly exploit the exclusive privilege to define and label objects and developments. Moreover, not only is a discussion of hotly debated topics forbidden, but even the opinions and approaches expressed in those discussions have absolutely no significance for the authorities and they in no way impact on their objectives or work style. This means that the media, rather than counterbalancing the coercion of the state machinery, are instead the source of unrestricted violence. Also, this is the reason that people assemble in the ‘square’, when the mass media are either closed or when they mostly abuse their capabilities to produce symbolic violence (for example - calling what’s black, white).

It is also possible to formulate this question in more general terms, as a post-Soviet cultural crisis of identity. The advantage of such a formulation is that it allows for the basic cultural shift to be viewed in the context of the global situation.

During the past few years Armenia completely returned to the Russian sphere of influence. The story of decolonization shows that countries liberated and obtaining independence from colonial domination, as a rule, wind up back under the rule of the former colonial power and that this time around domination is realized through the ruling class of the newly independent country. The factors pushing Armenia towards Russia are many. The traditional Armenian pro-Russian orientation, that today isn’t as steadfast as before, the alarming isolation of Armenia in the region, the inability to situate oneself within the global state of affairs (this is particularly made apparent by the activity of international and trans-national organizations in Armenia), etc. The other side of the question is that Kocharyan was like the air needed to fill the Russian sail. Under that sail he was trying to compensate for the serious lack of legitimacy he enjoyed as President.

Contrary to this, Russian influence isn’t as total as it once was. It has a serious rival in the likes of western and international organizations. This is particularly the case in the cultural field. The spread of western mass culture, the spread of the reach of broadcast and informational technologies, the growth of the use of English and other factors reminds us of the fact that there can no longer be any talk of Russian cultural dominance in conditions of global cultural penetration. In this way, external influences at work in Armenia have an interesting structure to them; the reestablishment of Russian economic and political influence is coinciding with the growing intrusion of western pop culture. In other words, the existing split between the forms of domination and hegemony coming into review remains one of the insurmountable reasons for the current identity crisis till today.

A few years ago, when there was pretentious talk emanating from a lofty podium regarding the brilliant future awaiting Armenia in the field of informational technologies, it was possible to view it as an affectation for a new Armenian and more western identity. But the resounding failure of that plan today leaves us in the same uncertainty regarding the question of cultural identity.